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Abstract
In this study, we examine firms’ investments in explorative initiatives and their choices
of capitalization method in a product-market competition setting. Since the capitalization of
exploration expenditures may contain information on whether a firm’s exploration investment is
successful, financial reports may reveal important information to competitors, and thus may have
real consequences in product-market competition. In our paper, we identify two driving forces
that induce firms to choose diﬀerent capitalization methods: an information-spillover eﬀect and
a preempting eﬀect. We also find that enforcing an accounting method that requires firms
to capitalize expenditures of only successful explorations may increase or decrease innovation
investments. Our study sheds light on the impact that the recognition of exploratory success
has on firms’ exploration investments.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study how diﬀerent accounting methods of capitalization aﬀect firms’ exploration-
investment decisions and how firms choose between these capitalization methods when given discre-
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tion. Because the capitalization of exploration expenditures may contain information on whether
a firm succeeds in its exploration investment, financial reports may reveal important information
to competitors. This information can potentially be used by competitors to imitate the innovative
firm’s investments, and therefore may substantially aﬀect the firm’s ability to compete in the future.
Consequently, the capitalization method prescribed by the accounting regime and the capitalization
method firms choose when given discretion can potentially aﬀect the firms’ exploration-investment
decisions in a competitive environment. In our paper, we identify two driving forces that induce
firms to choose a capitalization method: an information spillover eﬀect and a preempting eﬀect.
We also find that enforcing an accounting method that requires firms to capitalize expenditures of
only successful exploration may induce them to invest more or less, depending on their size and
the size of their competitors. Our study sheds light on the accounting choices of firms when given
discretion regarding capitalization methods and on the impact of accounting regulations on firms’
exploration investments and competition.
The oil and gas industry is subject to accounting regulations regarding the recognition of ex-
ploration costs for oil and gas reserves. Oil and gas companies can currently choose between the
full-cost method and the successful-eﬀorts method to recognize their exploratory costs. If a com-
pany chooses the full-cost method, it capitalizes all of its exploration costs, including dry-hole
costs. If a company chooses the successful-eﬀorts method, it expenses the exploration costs that
are related to unsuccessful exploration, and capitalizes only the expenditures related to successful
exploration. It is well documented that large oil and gas companies more often use the successful-
eﬀorts method, while smaller companies choose the full-cost method (Sunder, 1976; Deakin, 1979;
Dhaliwal, 1980; Bryant, 2003). The diﬀerence in the choices made by large and small oil and
gas companies is usually explained by the argument that small firms cannot aﬀord the earnings
volatility induced by the successful-eﬀorts method, because it would make it harder for small firms
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to obtain capital if they expensed their unsuccessful exploration costs. However, this argument
implies that the market cannot see through this earnings volatility. That is, it implies that the
market is not completely eﬃcient. Our model provides an alternative explanation for the diﬀerence
in preferences over capitalization methods that does not rely on market ineﬃciency.
In this paper, we examine a duopolistic setting in which firms have the option to choose between
the full-cost and successful-eﬀorts methods to capitalize their exploration expenditures. In our
model, an innovator firm moves first to choose its accounting method and decide its investment in
explorative activities. The other firm, which we call the imitator, moves later, deciding its investing
strategy after observing the accounting report issued by the innovator firm.1 After the outcomes
of both firms’ investments are realized, the two firms compete in a product market. Our analysis
shows that if the innovator is a small firm, it is more concerned about information spillover and
tends to choose the full-cost method; on the other hand, if the innovator is a large firm, ex ante
it may prefer to use the successful-eﬀorts method so that it will be able to secure its preemptive
advantage by disclosing its success.
We also examine the consequences of enforcing a uniform capitalization method on firms’
exploration-investment choices. The question of whether firms should be granted the option of
choosing between diﬀerent accounting-recognition methods for exploration expenditures has been
debated for decades. In 1977, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) proposed the
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 19 to remove the option of the full-cost method
in the oil and gas industry. However, the proposal encountered great resistance and was not en-
acted. Recently, this debate resurfaced again as the International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) initiated a project to eliminate the full-cost method for extractive industries in 1998 (In-
ternational Accounting Standards Committee 2000a). Again, the attempt to eliminate the full-cost
1Although we call the second mover in our model the "imitator" for convenience, the imitator may decide not to
imitate the innovator’s investments.
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method failed, and the final outcome of this project, International Financial Reporting Standard
6, still allows the choice between accounting methods. The elimination of the full-cost method
raises many concerns from both extractive-industry practitioners and academicians. One reason
in particular to oppose this proposed change is that the elimination of the full-cost method will
hinder small firms’ access to capital markets, and therefore prevent those firms from undertaking
innovative investments (Collins and Dent, 1979). However, our analysis shows that small firms
may invest more in innovative activities if the successful-eﬀorts method is enforced. This is because
under this regime, firms with information-spillover concerns may choose to invest more to dilute
the information content in their financial reports. Also, we find that if the full-cost method is
enforced, firms may invest less in their exploration activities. With the full-cost method, although
an innovator firm is not concerned about information-spillover repercussions, it nevertheless loses a
means of threatening its rival through the reporting of its successful exploration. As a consequence,
the firm may reduce its innovative investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of previous studies
that are relevant to our paper. In Section 3, we describe and analyze the main setting of our paper,
in which firms have the option to choose between the full-cost and successful-eﬀorts methods and
the innovator is a relatively large firm. In Section 4, we examine a setting in which only the
successful-eﬀorts method is allowed and a setting in which firms can only use the full-cost method.
In Section 5, for completeness, we provide the analysis of an alternative setup in which the imitator
firm is relatively large. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Our study is related to studies on the eﬀect of accounting disclosure in product market competition.
Darrough and Stoughton (1990) and Feltham and Xie (1992) examine the incentive firms have to
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disclose or withhold private information in an entry game, and they illustrate a tension between
an informed manager’s desire to communicate good news to (and hide bad news from) the capital
market and his desire to communicate bad news to (and hide good news from) competitors in the
product market. Arya and Mittendorf (2007) illustrate how firms’ incentives to withhold private
information from competitors are undercut by the fact that disclosures also boost analyst following,
which provides firms with new information about market conditions. Bagnoli and Watts (2010)
examine a Cournot competition setting in which firms can misreport their production costs. In
this study, we concentrate more on a tension between a desire to hide proprietary information to
deter rivals from imitating and a desire to disclose information to rivals to achieve a preemptive
advantage.
There are numerous empirical studies on the debate of whether extraction industries should keep
the option of choosing between the successful-eﬀorts and full-cost methods. Some studies indicate
that the successful-eﬀorts method is more informative. For example, Harris and Ohlson (1987) show
that the book values of firms using the successful-eﬀorts method have higher explanatory power
about their market values than those of firms using the full-cost method. Bandyopadhyay (1994)
compares the earnings-response coeﬃcients of successful-eﬀorts firms and full-cost firms around the
announcement of quarterly earnings over the 1982-1990 period, and finds that successful-eﬀorts
firms have higher coeﬃcients. There are also studies that shed light on how diﬀerent choices of
accounting methods may influence firms’ investment in exploration activities. For example, Johnson
and Ramanan (1988) examine the oil and gas industry during 1970-1976 and find that firms that
switch to the full-cost method exhibit higher level of exploration activities and higher leverage.
Lilien and Pastena (1982) find that revenues are positively associated with the successful-eﬀorts
choice, while leverage and exploratory aggressiveness are positively correlated with the full-cost
choice. Despite the abundance of empirical research in this area, there are few analytical studies
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on the cost and benefit of keeping the discretion between diﬀerent methods regarding extractive
industries’ exploration expenditures. We contribute to this line of literature by providing analytical
insights on this debate.
Our study is also related to studies on the aggregation in information disclosures. Arya,
Frimor, and Mittendorf (2010) study the discretionary disclosure of proprietary information by
multi-segment firms. They show that a disaggregate report may convey high cost in some markets
to soften rival competition, but at the same time inevitably convey low cost in the other markets and
induce fiercer competition. As a result, they find that the optimal disclosure aggregates segment
details. In our paper, aggregation is not across segments, but across successful and unsuccessful
investments in the same market. As a result, our paper does not need to rely on multiple markets
to show the eﬀects of disclosure aggregation. Instead, we show that firms choose between less ag-
gregated or more aggregated disclosure policies depending on their relative size to competitors and
the severity of the information spillover. Hayes and Lundholm (1996) examine a firm’s disclosure
of segment details when facing both a capital market and a product market, and show that the
firm may withhold information when the product market concerns are suﬃciently pronounced. In
our paper, capital markets do not play a role. Instead, the product market is at center stage, and
aggregation is instrumental in reducing the information spillover to competitors.
3 The Main Model
3.1 Setup
We consider a setting in which there are two firms, A and B, that compete in a Cournot duopoly
product market. Before the firms compete in the product market, however, they can make explo-
ration investments that, when successful, improve their ability to compete. We further assume that
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firms invest sequentially. In particular, firm A decides first on its exploration investments, and once
the investments outcomes are realized, firm A issues a public accounting report. After observing
firm A’s accounting report, firm B decides on its own investments. Firm B’s decision on whether to
imitate firm A’s innovation depends on how much information firm B is able to obtain before decid-
ing on its own exploration investments. This information is determined in part by the accounting
report issued by firm A, and therefore by the accounting regulatory regime. This sequence of events
allows us to examine both the endogenous accounting choices of innovating firms and the eﬀect of
accounting regulation on exploratory investments taking into account the resulting spillover of in-
formation in a competitive environment. We often refer to firm A as an “innovator” and to firm B
as an “imitator.” Also, in our analysis and discussion, we use the oil and gas industry as a running
example. In this industry, the accounting regulations regarding capital expenditures in exploratory
activities have been the subject of frequent debate by both practitioners and researchers. For this
reason, it provides us with realistic examples to illustrate our model and analysis. Nevertheless,
our analysis can be interpreted in a much broader way and can potentially be applied to a wide set
of industries.2
We characterize the space of possible exploration initiatives as being subdivided into “areas”
of exploration. Depending on the industry, these areas can have a diﬀerent interpretation. For
instance, in the extractive industry an area can be thought of as the proximity of a mining or
drilling location; in the pharmaceutical industry an area can be understood as a line of research for
a new drug for a specific disease; in the software industry an area might be the sort of application
under development, and so forth. Exploration initiatives can be kept more or less confidential
depending on the industry, but they can seldom be completely private. We reflect this fact by
assuming that competitors can observe the areas in which a firm explores. The extent to which the
2For example, the software industry also encounters the problem of how to capitalize firms’ R&D expenses, and
diﬀerent accounting recognition rules may have real eﬀects on firms’ innovation investments.
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observability of explored areas is informative is also contingent on the industry under consideration.
In the extractive industry, for instance, knowing the location in which another firm is exploring is
potentially very informative. In the software industry, however, knowing what sort of application
a firm is developing might be not as useful without more detail. Still, the information of which
areas a firm is exploring might be a lot more valuable if the outcome of the exploration is also
known. Depending on the accounting regulatory regime and the accounting choices of the report-
ing firm, the success or failure of exploration initiatives is potentially revealed by the accounting
report. Notice that in our paper the innovator and imitator compete in the same market, and the
innovator’s exploration-outcome disclosure should be relevant to its competitor’s decisions in the
market competition for similar products.
We assume that there are plenty of exploration “areas” in which firms can invest. We assume
that a firm can potentially invest in several areas, and that the exploration outcome in each of these
areas is binary: success or failure. We denote the probability of success of an investment in a specific
area by , and we assume that 0    13  That is, we assume the ex-ante probability of success is
not too large so that information about the innovator’s success is relevant to the imitator. We also
assume that this probability is public information and independent across diﬀerent areas. To avoid
unnecessary complexity in the Bayesian updating, we further assume that if an exploration in an
area is successful, then any subsequent exploration in that area is also successful with certainty.
For instance, if a firm finds an oil reserve in a certain area, any other firm exploring this same
area profits from drilling the same oil reserve. On the other hand, if a firms fails to succeed in
exploring an area, other firms also fail when exploring the same area. To reflect the increased
competitiveness obtained through a successful exploration, we assume that a success increases the
contribution margin per unit of firm A by a quantity , where 0    14 .3 If firm B succeeds
3We assume   1
4
in our model If   1
4
 we can show that the preempting eﬀect will be so overwhelming that B
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in exploring a diﬀerent area, it obtains the same benefit. However, if it explores in an area in
which firm A already succeeded, firm B only increases its contribution margin per unit by , with
0    1. One can think of  as incorporating the fact that the extent to which the success by
the innovator can be imitated by the follower varies from industry to industry. For instance, in
extractive industries,  may reflect the fact that the first firm that obtains success in exploring a
specific area may take the best “spots,” while subsequent entrants can only take the leftovers. In
a technology industry,  may reflect the fact that the pioneering firm may obtain an advantage in
the form of a reputation for innovation or for technical sophistication in the mind of consumers.
In this study, we concentrate on cases in which  is not too small by assuming   4 This is
because when  is very small, the benefit from imitation is so small that B never wants to imitate
A’s investment. Because we are interested in B’s imitating decision and this case does not bring
any additional insight, we rule it out to avoid taxing readers with tedious analysis.
To consider the eﬀect of firm size on accounting discretionary choices and investment decisions,
we reflect the size of a firm in the model by assuming that larger firms have a lower cost of
investment. This is to reflect the reality that, for example, it is easier for large firms to access
capital than for small firms, and large firms may also enjoy the benefit of economies of scale.
Regardless of their size, however, we assume that all firms have a convex cost of investment. That
is, each additional area is more expensive to explore. We denote firm ’s cost of investing in the 
area by  . For instance, the cost of exploring a second area for firm  is 2 . The investment-cost
convexity then implies that   +1. We examine two scenarios. In the main analysis, we examine
a scenario in which firm A is large and firm B is small. More specifically, firm A can explore up to
two areas. Its first exploration costs 1 ( 0), and its second exploration costs 2 , where 2  1 .
will not invest at all when A discloses no information about its success, which is not an interesting case and provides
limited insight compared with our currrent setting.
4The derivation of the value of  is available in the Appendix.
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Firm B can only invest in up to one area. That is, the cost of investing in one area is 1 ( 0), and
the cost of investing in a second area is ∞. Later in Section 5, we examine the opposite situation,
a scenario in which firm A is small and firm B is large.
In the main analysis, we assume the cost is not too large to preempt firms from investing.
The reason is that if B’s cost is so high that it chooses not to invest when it does not obtain any
information from A’s report, then A will always choose not to disclose any information about its
outcome, so that B will not have a chance to get the increase in its contribution margin. To focus
on interesting cases that B will invest even without any information of A’s outcome, we assume
1   = 4(1+−2)9 from now on.5 With this assumption, A will always invest in at least one
innovative investment and B will not be completely discouraged from making an investment when
A invests.
In the oil and gas industry, there has been a long debate regarding the recognition of the cost
of exploring for oil and gas reserves. Currently, oil and gas companies can choose between the full-
cost method or the successful-eﬀorts method to recognize these costs. These two capitalizations
methods are informatively diﬀerent, and therefore provide us with a case of a specific regulatory
choice that potentially aﬀects the amount of information spillover between competing firms.6 We
examine three regulatory regimes. In this section, we examine the case in which firms are allowed
to choose between the two capitalization methods. In Section 4, we examine the consequences of
enforcing the successful-eﬀorts method and the consequences of enforcing the full-cost method.
5The detailed derivation of this threshold is in the Appendix.
6Oil and gas firms that use the full-cost method usually do not write oﬀ their dry wells separately. When
they write oﬀ their assets, it is usually diﬃcult to tell whether the write oﬀs are due to dry wells or other assets
impairments. However, even if they write oﬀ the book value of their dry wells and disclose, which reveals information
of the exploration results, write oﬀs usually do not occur in a timely manner and are not useful in competitors’
investment-in-exploration decisions.
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date 1 date 2 date 3
Firm A chooses a Firm A observes the investment The outcome of
capitalization outcome and reports. both firms’ investments
method and makes its Firm B makes the investment is revealed. The two
investment decision. decision after observing A’s firms compete in a
report. Cournot market.
Figure 1: Time line.
We examine a setting with three dates. Figure 1 illustrates the time line. At date 1, firm A
chooses whether to use the full-cost or the successful-eﬀorts method, and decides on the area(s)
to explore. Firm A’s capitalization method and which area(s) it chooses to explore are publicly
observable. At date 2, A reports according to its previous choice of accounting method. We denote
firm A’s report by  = ( b), where  ∈ {1 2} is the number of areas that firm A explores,
and b ∈ {0 1 2} ∪ {∅} is the reported number of areas in which the exploration was successful.
Notice that under the successful-eﬀorts method, the accounting report provides information about
the aggregate successful investment. In that case, we let b ∈ {0 1 2} be the number of successful
areas of exploration. Obviously, the firm can only succeed in areas in which it invested; i.e.,  ≤ 
Under the full-cost method, however, the report does not distinguish between successful and failed
exploration investments. That is, under the full-cost method the accounting report provides no
new information; i.e., in that case we set b = ∅. Firm B observes A’s report and makes its own
exploration decision by choosing  ∈ {0  }, where  = 0 means that firm B does not invest,
 =  means that firm B chooses to explore one of the same areas firm A previously explored, and
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 =  means that firm B explores a diﬀerent area than firm A.
At date 3, the outcomes of both firms’ explorations are revealed and both firms compete in
a Cournot product market.7 That is, we assume that the initial information provided in the
accounting reports is timely enough for the imitator to make investment decisions, and that by the
time the investment outcomes aﬀect the market competition the outcomes have been fully revealed.
We denote the exploration outcome of firm B by  ∈ {0  } where 0 means that either B does
not invest or that B’s exploration fails,8  means that B succeeds in an area in which A previously
succeeded, and  means that B succeeds in a diﬀerent area than the ones explored by A.
The payoﬀ functions of firms A and B are, respectively:
Π = (1−  −  + )− 1 − 2 ·  (1)
Π = (1−  −  + )− 1 ·  (2)
where  for  ∈ {} is the change in contribution margin obtained through successful explo-
ration. In particular,  =  if A finds oil in one area,  = 2 if A finds oil in two areas,  = 
if B finds oil in a diﬀerent area than A,  =  if B finds oil in the same area as A, and  is
zero if firm ’s exploration fails. Also,  is an indicator variable that equals zero if A explores one
area and equals one if A explores two areas;  is an indicator variable that is zero if B does not
invest in exploration and equals one if B explores one area. We denote firm ’s quantity decision
by , and 1−  −  +  represents firm ’s contribution margin,   ∈ {}. The price of the
product is decreased by both firm ’s production and the other firm’s production, and we assume
the products are perfectly substitutable.
7 In the Appendix, we also examine a Bertrand competition and show that our results with a Cournot competition
assumption are robust in a Bertrand setting in which successful exploration reduces the innovator’s production cost.
8Because firm A cannot take advantage of this information in making its investment decisions, these two outcomes
are equivalent.
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3.2 Information-Spillover Eﬀect and Preempting Eﬀect
In this subsection, we will derive the equilibrium of our model and illustrate two eﬀects that
influence the equilibrium: the information-spillover eﬀect and the preempting eﬀect. If firm A
reports using the successful-eﬀorts method, its accounting report contains information about the
outcome of its exploration activities, and its competitors may take advantage of the “spilled”
information about A’s successful explorations by imitating A’s investment. We call this eﬀect the
information-spillover eﬀect. Notice that even though A’s report by the successful-eﬀorts method is
informative, the information spilled may not be complete. For example, when A achieves success
in just some of its exploration areas, B does not know which area can bring success. On the
other hand, when firm A discloses a successful outcome, A secures its preemptive advantage in the
competition, and this advantage may intimidate competitors. We call this eﬀect the preempting
eﬀect. In the following analysis, we will illustrate in detail how these two eﬀects interact and aﬀect
the equilibrium strategies of both innovator and imitator.
To derive the equilibrium, we proceed by backward induction. At date 3, both firms’ exploration
outcomes are realized and publicly observed. Solving a standard Cournot game, we have firm ’s
optimal production quantity ∗ = 1+2−3 , and firm ’s gross payoﬀ without considering the
investment/exploration cost is
( ) = ∗ (1− ∗ − ∗ + ) = (1 + 2 − )
2
9

with  =  ·   =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if  = 0
 if  = 
 if  = 
   ∈ {}
Diﬀerent combinations of the two firms’ exploration outcomes give diﬀerent gross payoﬀs for the
13
two firms. We list these gross payoﬀs in Table 1 in the Appendix.
3.2.1 Firm B’s Strategies Given Firm A’s Report
We first examine firm B’s strategies at date 2, taking firm A’s report as given. At date 2, A reports
according to its choice of capitalization method that has been determined at date 1. Notice that
under the full-cost regime, A does not disclose its number of successes, therefore b = ∅. Firm B
observes A’s report and makes its own exploration decision  ∈ {0  } to maximize its expected
payoﬀ,
max
[Π|( b)] = [( )|( b) ]− 1 · 
Because firm A may report using either the successful-eﬀorts method or the full-cost method,
we now analyze B’s strategies in these two cases separately. We first study the case in which A
uses the successful-eﬀorts method, and then the case in which A reports with the full-cost method.
B’s strategies given A’s report using the successful-eﬀorts method. If A uses the successful-
eﬀorts method to report, firm B observes exactly the number of success(es) A has obtained and
knows the value of , even though B may not know which area has brought success to A (this
happens in the case when A invests in two areas and reports only one success).
Let’s obtain firm B’s optimal investment choice for each possible accounting report issued by
firm A using the successful-eﬀorts method. To do that, we compare firm B’s payoﬀs across B’s
investment choices for a given firm A’s report, [Π|( b)] First, it is obvious that when
firm A reports no success, exploring a same area as A does not bring any success to B.9 Thus firm
B explores a diﬀerent area when A reports zero successes. (The assumption 1   guarantees
that investing in a diﬀerent area dominates the no-investment strategy.)
9We list firm B’s expected payoﬀs based on diﬀerent reports from A by the successful-eﬀorts method,
[Π |( )] in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Regions that delimit B’s strategies, given that A uses the successful-eﬀorts method.
When firm A reports a non-zero success(es) outcome, firm B’s optimal investment strategy
depends on both its investment cost (1 ) and the information-spillover eﬀect. The information
spillover, to some extent, can be measured by  Notice that when  is high ( → 1), A’s disclosed
information brings a large benefit to B, as B is able to imitate A’s investment and obtain a large
increase in its contribution margin. On the other hand, when  is close to zero, B cannot benefit
from the information of A’s investment outcome. This spillover eﬀect is especially strong when A
reports full success in its invested area(s), that is, when either A invests in one area and achieves
one success or A invests in two areas and achieves two successes. In the case that A invests in two
areas but reports only one success (that is, A reports partial success), the information content is
diluted, as B cannot tell which area of A’s investments has brought success.
Our analysis shows that B’s strategy depends on the relative strength of the spillover and
preemptive eﬀects. The relative strength of these eﬀects, in turn, depends on the parameters  and
1 . We illustrate B’s optimal strategies given A’s report by the successful-eﬀorts method in Figure
1.
In Region I in Figure 1, which is delimited by 1  {1()} and 1   ≤ 1, our
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analysis based on B’s expected payoﬀs shows that ∗() =  for  = (1 1) (2 1) or (2 2).10 That
is, when the information-spillover eﬀect is significantly strong, firm B will imitate A’s investment
and explore a same area as firm A, as long as firm A reports any successful exploration.
In Region II, which is delimited by 1  49 and    ≤ 1, if A reports full success, we still
have the result that B invests in a same area as A. However, when A reports partial success, B only
has a fifty-percent chance of obtaining success by imitating A, and thus the benefit from imitating
A is small (notice that not only  is lower than that in Region I, but also the information content
from A’s report is diluted when A reports partial success). Therefore, in this case B finds that it
is better to invest in a diﬀerent area when firm A reports partial success.
In Region III, which is delimited by {49 1()}  1  {2()}, B’s cost of
investment becomes higher than that in Region II. When A reports full success, we still have the
same result as those in Regions I and II that B will invest in a same area. However, now when A
reports partial success, B will not invest at all. This is because A only discloses diluted information
and has secured some preemptive advantage, while B has only a fifty-percent chance of succeeding
by imitating A and has a high cost of investment. Therefore, B will choose not to invest at all.
In Region IV, which is delimited by 2()  1   and    we find that B will choose
not to invest even if A reports success in both of its areas (∗() = 0 for  = (2 2)). It is
interesting that even when A reports full success in its two invested areas ( = (2 2)) and B can
achieve certain success by investing in either of A’s areas, B’s optimal strategy is not to invest
at all. This result is driven by two forces. First, when A has already obtained two successes, its
contribution margin per unit has increased by 2, and its competitive advantage is large. That
is, A has secured its preemptive advantage in the future competition. Second, as  is small but
B’s investment cost is high, the benefit of investing cannot outweigh the cost. Overall, even if B
10The derivations of the closed-form values of all thresholds are available in the Appendix.
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obtains perfect information about successful areas from A’s report (the information is fully spilled
over to B), the preempting eﬀect dominates.
In Region IV when A reports success in its only investment, we find that B invests in the same
area, because the information spillover still dominates; however, when A reports partial success,
A’s secured preemptive advantage as well as B’s high investment cost induce B not to invest at all.
Notice that the information-spillover eﬀect as well as the preempting eﬀect exists in all the
above diﬀerent cases and both play roles in B’s investment decision. Which eﬀect dominates in
the trade-oﬀ, together with the consideration of B’s investment cost, determines firm B’s strategy.
Our results of B’s optimal strategies given A’s successful-eﬀorts reports, denoted by ∗(), are
concluded in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Firm B’s optimal strategies when firm A reports using the successful-eﬀorts method are
summarized in the following table:
 = (1 0) or (2 0)  = (1 1)  = (2 1)  = (2 2)
Region I ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() = 
Region II ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() = 
Region III ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() = 0 ∗() = 
Region IV ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() = 0 ∗() = 0
B’s strategies given A’s report using the full-cost method. Now we consider the case in
which A reports using the full-cost method. In this case, B does not know in how many areas A
succeeds. Therefore, B has to make the investment decision based on its conjecture of 
Comparing the expected payoﬀs of B based on A’s report using the full-cost method, [Π|( ∅)],
we obtain that [Π| ( ∅)]  [Π| ( ∅)] for  ∈ {1 2}.11 That is, if A reports under the
11The explicit expressions of firm B’s expected payoﬀs based on firm A’s report under the full-cost method,
[Π |( ∅)]are available in the Appendix.
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full-cost regime, exploring a diﬀerent area from A’s area(s) is always a better strategy for B than
exploring a same area as A. The intuition is that A provides no information about its exploration
outcome under the full-cost regime, and therefore no information “spilled over” to B. B’s belief
about the probability of success stays unchanged. That is, no matter whether B decides to explore
a same area as A or a diﬀerent area, B’s prior belief about the probability of success is . However,
if B follows A’s exploration and achieves success, B will only get  =  and benefit less from the
success than from a success in a diﬀerent area. In addition, with the assumption 1  , for firm
B, investing in a diﬀerent area dominates no investment. Therefore, whenever firm A chooses the
full-cost method, firm B will explore a diﬀerent area. We illustrate this result in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 When firm A reports using the full-cost method, firm B chooses to invest in a diﬀerent
area.
3.2.2 Firm A’s Reporting-Method Choices
Now we are back to date 1 to analyze A’s decisions on its capitalization method and innovation
investments. We denote A’s choice of accounting-reporting method to be ,  ∈ { }, where
 represents the full-cost method and  represents the successful-eﬀorts method.
We first analyze A’s optimal reporting method given A’s investment decision incorporating
B’s optimal responses given in Lemmas 1 and 2. In Section 3.2.3 we will compare A’s expected
payoﬀs with diﬀerent combination of  and  to derive A’s optimal investment strategies and
accounting-method choice.
A’s reporting-method choices given  = 1 We first examine the case in which A invests in
one area. Notice that, according to Lemmas 1 and 2, if A uses the full-cost method, B invests in
a diﬀerent area; if A uses the successful-eﬀorts method, firm B invests in a same area if A reports
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success and in a diﬀerent area otherwise. Therefore, A’s expected payoﬀs with the two alternative
reporting methods are as follows:
[Π|1 ] = [( ) + (1− )( 0)] + (1− )[(0 ) + (1− )(0 0)]− 1
=
1− [2 + (5− 4)]
9
− 1 ;
[Π|1 ] = ( ) + (1− )[(0 ) + (1− )(0 0)]− 1
=
1 + {2(1 + − ) + [5− − (4− )]}
9
− 1 
Our analysis shows that [Π|1 ]  [Π|1 ]. That is, A will choose the full-cost
method when it invests in one area. Intuitively, when A invests in only one area, the information-
spillover eﬀect is very strong because firm B achieves a certain success by imitating A’s investment
as long as A reports success. Therefore, firm A prefers the full-cost method to avoid revealing any
information about its success to prevent B from imitating.
A’s reporting method choices given  = 2 When A invests in two areas, according to
Lemmas 1 and 2, B’s optimal investment strategy depends not only on A’s report, but also on
the severeness of the information spillover,  and B’s cost of investment, 1 . To derive A’s
optimal reporting method, we compare A’s expected payoﬀ when choosing the full-cost method,
[Π|2 ] with that of choosing the successful-eﬀorts method, [Π|2 ] incorporating firm
B’s optimal responses in all regions depicted in Figure 1. We illustrate the result in Figure 2, and
formally present A’s optimal reporting-method choice, ∗ in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 In Region FC, A always prefers the full-cost method (∗ = ); in Region FC/SE, A
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Figure 2: Regions that delimit A’s optimal reporting-method choices.
prefers the full-cost method when investing in one area, and prefers the successful-eﬀorts method
when investing in two areas (∗ =  when  = 1; ∗ =  when  = 2).
In Figure 2, Region  includes Region I and Region II in Figure 1. That is, 0  1 
{49  1()} and     1. Region FC/SE in Figure 2 is the union of Regions III and IV
in Figure 1. That is, Region FC/SE is defined by {49  1()  1   and     1.
Notice that in Region ,  is big or 1 is small. Intuitively, B is likely to imitate A either
because the benefit from imitating is large or because the cost of investment is low. Therefore, A
chooses the full-cost method to avoid B’s imitation. In Region ,  is relatively small and
1 is relatively large, compared with Region . B now has a smaller incentive to imitate A due
to a high investment cost and a low benefit from imitating, especially when A invests in two areas
because the informative content is diluted. Therefore, A chooses the successful-eﬀorts method in
Region  when it invests in two areas to obtain a strong preemptive advantage.
To analyze A’s optimal investment decision in diﬀerent regions, we compare A’s investment
profits under diﬀerent combinations of reporting and investment decisions. We find that there is a
threshold, ( 1 ) such that A invests in two areas if 2  ( 1 ) and invests in one area
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otherwise. It is straightforward that firm A invests more when its investment cost is low while it
invests less when its cost is high.
3.2.3 The Equilibrium
With all the results we have so far, we are now able to derive the equilibrium decisions for both firm
A and firm B. The equilibrium strategies are formally presented in Proposition 1 and illustrated in
Figure 3.
Proposition 1 (i) For Region , firm A chooses to report under the full-cost method and firm
B always explores a diﬀerent area. Firm A explores one area if 2  ( 1 ) and explores two
areas if 2  ( 1 ).
(ii) For Region  ∩ , firm A chooses to invest in one area using the full-cost method
if 2  ( 1 ), and invests in two areas using the successful-eﬀorts method if 2  ( 1 ).
B invests in a diﬀerent area if A reports no success or chooses the full-cost method, in a same area
if A reports full success, and does not invest at all if A reports partial success.
(iii) For Region  ∩  , firm A chooses to invest in one area using the full-cost method
if 2  ( 1 ), and invests in two areas using the successful-eﬀorts method if 2  ( 1 ).
B invests in a diﬀerent area if A reports no success or chooses the full-cost method, in a same area
if A reports success in its only investment, and does not invest at all if A reports any success out
of two investments.
We illustrate the equilibrium strategies for both firms in Figure 3. First, firm A chooses to use
the full-cost method in Region , where the information-spillover eﬀect is severe ( is large) or it
is cheap for B to invest ( 1 is small). Intuitively, because the information-spillover eﬀect in Region
 is very strong or B’s cost of investment is very low, B will imitate A’s investment as long as
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Figure 3: Regions that delimit both firms’ optimal strategies.
A reports any success. Therefore, firm A prefers to choose the full-cost method to avoid revealing
any information about its success so that it can prevent B from imitating. As a consequence, B
will always invest in a diﬀerent area because it does not obtain any information from A’s report.
In Regions  ∩  (the overlapped area of Region  in Figure 2 and Region 
in Figure 1) and  ∩  (the overlapped area of Region  in Figure 2 and Region
 in Figure 1), B’s cost is relatively high and  is relatively low. Any reported success gives
A a competitive advantage as the “Stackelberg leader.” When A uses successful-eﬀorts, as  gets
smaller, B’s benefit from imitating A declines (the information-spillover eﬀect is weakened). In
addition, when A’s investment cost is low, A is able to further dilute the information content of its
report by investing in two areas, which makes the information-spillover eﬀect even weaker. Now
A may have an incentive to choose successful-eﬀorts and disclose its success(es) to intimidate B. B
may then choose not to invest at all upon the reported success.
Notice that by using the successful-eﬀorts method, firms communicate two types of information:
the probability of success for imitation, and the increase in the contribution margin per unit by
the innovator’s success(es). When small firms report under the successful-eﬀorts method, the small
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size of their investments makes their accounting reports very informative about the probability of
success for potential imitation. Large firms, however, can aﬀord large investments which make their
accounting reports much less informative for potential imitators. That is, the information-spillover
problem is more severe for small firms. The other information, the information about the increase
in the contribution margin per unit (i.e., the increase in competitive advantage), provides firms the
preemptive advantage. Firms, especially large firms, are motivated to choose the successful-eﬀorts
method to disclose the latter kind of information to intimidate competitors.
The predictions in Propositions 1 are consistent with firms’ diﬀerent choices between the
successful-eﬀorts and the full-cost methods in reality. Previous studies have shown that large
oil and gas companies usually choose the successful-eﬀorts method, while small oil and gas com-
panies prefer the full-cost method (Sunder, 1976; Deakin, 1979; Dhaliwal, 1980; Bryant, 2003).
Conventional wisdom regarding this diﬀerence in preferences usually focuses on the consequences
on reported earnings. That is, the successful-eﬀorts method may induce more volatile earnings, and
small firms cannot aﬀord the market consequences of this volatility. Our analysis provides another
explanation from the competition point of view regarding information spillover. That is, small
firms with a cost disadvantage are more reluctant to choose the successful-eﬀorts method because
they suﬀer from severe information spillover. Their competitors, especially those with cost and
investment advantages, can easily imitate the small firms’ exploration and reduce the small firms’
competitive advantage from innovation. On the other hand, large firms with cost advantages prefer
the successful-eﬀorts method. This is because large firms can aﬀord to make larger investments
that dilute the information content of their reported success(es), and they are willing to disclose
their success to secure their preemptive advantages.12
12The SEC and FASB also require oil and gas companies to disclose the information of their proved reserves in
footnotes. However, this kind of disclosure can hardly substitute for the capitalization of exploration costs under the
successul-eﬀorts method.
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4 The Regulatorily-Enforced Accounting Method
The debate about whether oil and gas companies should retain the option of choosing diﬀerent
accounting methods for their exploration costs has continued for over four decades. In 1977, the
SEC proposed FASB 19, which aimed to enforce the successful-eﬀorts method and eliminate the
full-cost method. This proposal was rejected by many companies as well as some scholars, and was
eventually abandoned by the SEC. Recently, the trend of converging the GAAP with the IFRS has
brought this long-standing debate to the spotlight again, as the IFRS does not support the full-cost
method.
To shed light on the costs and benefits of eliminating companies’ choices between diﬀerent
accounting methods regarding their exploration costs, we examine a setting in which the successful-
eﬀorts method is enforced. For completeness of analysis, we also look at a setting in which the
full-cost method is the only reporting option. We focus on how the elimination of accounting-
method choices influences firms’ investments in exploration/innovation. We find that the enforced
successful-eﬀorts method induces either more or less investment in innovation, while the enforced
full-cost method always results in less investment in innovation.
First, footnote disclosure of proved reserves is far less timely in revealing firms’ successes in exploration activities
than the capitalization of exploration cost. An exploratory well should be capitalized on or shortly after the completion
of drilling if oil and gas reserves are found, even though the classification of those reserves as proved cannot be made
when drilling is completed. The FASB allows firms to determine whether the reserves are proved reserves in one
year after the capitalization (FASB Current Text Section Oi5, paragraphs 122-125; SFAS No. 19, paragraphs 31-34),
which may result in a large gap in timing between the capitalization of exploration cost and the footnote disclosure
of proved reserves.
In addition, the information of proved reserves disclosed in footnotes is not audited, while the capitalization of
exploration cost is audited (SFAS No. 69).
Furthermore, the change in proved reserves may not contain the same information content as the capitalization of
exploration cost regarding the successes of a firm’s exploration. The change may be due to many factors other than
the expansion or discovery of new reserves, such as modified estimation of existing wells, changes in technology, and
changes in market prices (SFAS No. 69).
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4.1 The Enforced Successful-Eﬀorts Method
We first compare firm A’s investment decisions under the enforced successful-eﬀorts regime and
decisions under the discretionary regime. Since we are more interested in analyzing the impact of
accounting regulations on innovative investments as opposed to imitative activities, we focus on
firm A’s investment decisions.
We derive A’s optimal investing strategy under the successful-eﬀorts regime by comparing A’s
expected payoﬀs of 1, 2, and 0 investments. We find that there is a threshold for A’s cost of the first
investment, 1 , and a threshold for A’s cost of the second investment,  ( 1  1 ) (the values
of these thresholds are available in the Appendix), such that when the successful-eﬀorts method
is enforced, firm A explores two areas if 2   ( 1  1 ), explores one area if 1  1 and
2   ( 1  1 ), and does not invest at all if 1  1 and 2   ( 1 ). We formally
present A’s optimal investing strategies in Lemma 4. We also illustrate A’s investment strategies
in Figures 4 and 5.
Lemma 4 If the successful-eﬀorts method is enforced,
(i) when 1  1 , firm A invests in one area if 2   ( 1  1 ), and invests in two areas
if 2   ( 1  1 );
(ii) when 1  1 , firm A does not invest if 2   ( 1  1 ), and invests in two areas if
2   ( 1  1 ).
Notice that when the successful-eﬀorts method is enforced, A suﬀers from the information
spillover. In particular, when A has a high cost of investments, 1  1 and 2   ( 1  1 ),
it can not aﬀord to increase investment to dilute the information content in its report. Therefore,
A chooses not to invest.
Recall that Proposition 1 shows that under the discretionary regime, firm A invests in two
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Figure 4: Investment decisions under the enforced successful-eﬀorts regime vs. under the discre-
tionary regime when 1  1 .
areas with cost 2  ( 1 ), and invests in one area if 2  ( 1 ) We now examine the
accounting-reporting regime’s eﬀect on A’s investment strategy by comparing A’s investment in
Lemma 4 with that in Proposition 1.
Firm A’s optimal investment when 1  1 is illustrated in Figure 4. When 1  1 
we can prove that  ( 1  1 )  ( 1 ). Therefore, when the accounting-reporting regime
switches from the discretionary regime to the enforced successful-eﬀorts regime, firm A’s investment
decision will not change if 2  ( 1 ) or 2   ( 1  1 ). However, if ( 1 )  2 
 ( 1  1 ), firm A increases its investment from one area to two areas.
Firm A’s optimal investment when 1  1 is illustrated in Figure 5. For 1  1 , we can
prove that 2   ( 1  1 ) if  is large or 1 is small (i.e.,  and 1 locate in  ).
Therefore, firm A does not invest when the successful-eﬀorts regime is enforced. Intuitively, when
the information spilled from A’s report is highly useful or when B’s investment cost is low, B has
a strong incentive to imitate A. On the other hand, firm A has high investment costs and can not
aﬀord to dilute the informative content in its report by increasing its investment. Thus, A will
choose not to invest to avoid the information spillover.
For 1  1 , we can also prove that  ( 1  1 )  ( 1 ) if  is small and 1 is large
(i.e.,  and 1 locate in  ). As depicted in Figure 5 , when the accounting-reporting
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Figure 5: Investment decisions under the enforced successful-eﬀorts regime vs. under the discre-
tionary regime when 1  1 .
regime switches from the discretionary regime to the successful-eﬀorts regime, firm A’s investment
decision does not change if 2  ( 1 ), and decreases from one area to no investment if
2   ( 1  1 ) However, A’s investment increases from one area to two areas if ( 1 ) 
2   ( 1  1 ).
It is surprising that A may increase investment in innovation under the enforced successful-
eﬀorts regime. Conventional wisdom may predict a decline in A’s investment, because now A does
not have the choice of using the full-cost method to prevent information spillover to its competitor.
However, our analysis shows that A may increase its investment under the enforced successful-
eﬀorts regime, and the reason is directly due to the information-spillover eﬀect. As long as A’s cost
of investments are not very high, to protect its competitive advantage, A may have to invest more
so as to dilute the information content in its report and mitigate the damage from information
spilled to its rival. However, if A has very high costs of investment, it cannot aﬀord to increase its
investment to dilute the information content and is forced to quit its exploration.
We summarize our results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Compared with the investment in the discretionary regime,
(i) if 2  ( 1 ), firm A’s investing strategy stays unchanged under the enforced successful-
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eﬀorts regime;
(ii) if ( 1 )  2   ( 1  1 ), firm A invests more under the enforced successful-
eﬀorts regime;
(iii) if 2   ( 1  1 ), firm A invests less under the enforced successful-eﬀorts when
1  1 , and invests at the same amount when 1  1 .
4.2 The Enforced Full-Cost Method
Although regulators have no intention of imposing the full-cost method (in fact, regulators always
try to eliminate the full-cost choice), for the completeness of the analysis, we also examine a case
in which firms can only use the full-cost method to recognize their exploration costs.13 We think it
may still provide us insight on regulatory implications. To derive A’s optimal investment strategies
under the full-cost regime, we need to compare A’s expected payoﬀs [Π|] with  ∈ {1 2},
incorporating firm B’s optimal responses in Lemma 2. We find that there is a threshold of A’s
investment cost,  , such that firm A invests in two areas with a cost 2   and invests in
only one area if 2   . We can prove that ( 1 ) ≥  for any  and 1 . As shown
in Figure 6, when switching the accounting-reporting regime from the discretionary regime to the
full-cost regime, firm A’s investment does not change if 2  ( 1 ) or 2   . However,
when ( 1 )  2   , firm A will reduce its investment from two areas to one area. We
formally state the result in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Compared with the investment in the discretionary regime, firm A invests less in
innovation under the enforced full-cost regime.
13 In practice, because a firm can still preempt rivals by revealing favorable information through other channels—such
as disclosures in footnotes of the financial reports or disclosures through media—the enforced full-cost method may
not eliminate the preempting eﬀect. Nevertheless, we still examine this hypothetical setting for the completeness of
the analysis.
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Figure 6: Firms’ investment decisions under the enforced full-cost regime vs. under the discretionary
regime.
It may also seem counter-intuitive that A would invest less under the enforced full-cost regime.
With the full-cost method, firm A is not concerned about the damage from information spillover
to its competitor. However, it also loses its capability to preempt its rival by reporting its success
using the successful-eﬀorts method. That is, although there is no information spillover, the benefit
from the preempting eﬀect disappears as well. Thus, A is more reluctant to invest in innovation
and its optimal investment declines.
5 Alternative Setup
In the main setting of our paper, we examine the innovator-imitator game assuming that A is
a big firm with a lower overall investment cost while B is a small firm. In this section, we will
consider the reverse case in which A is a small firm and B is a big firm.14 Now we assume A
can only invest in up to one area while B can invest in up to two areas. That is, we assume A’s
cost of investing in one area is 1  0, and the cost of investing in a second area, 2  is ∞. B’s
14 In our paper, we are interested in cases of competition between firms with diﬀerent sizes, as in reality the resistance
to the proposal of emilinating the full-cost method is always from firms of smaller size.
Although settings in which firms are of similar sizes are not our focus, we examined the cases that both innovator
and imitator are of the same size for completeness. In the setting in which both firms are small, it is easy to
verify that the firms’ accounting-method choices depend on their investment costs and their decisions are determined
by information spillover and preempting eﬀects, which we have identified in the main setting. In the setting in
which both firms are large, we have countless cases and the analysis is hardly presentable. Nevertheless, the firms’
accounting-method choices are still driven by the same two eﬀects.
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investment cost in the first area is 1  0. B’s cost for the second investment is 2  0 and
we assume 2  2 = 4(1++)9 so that firm B will optimally invest in two areas when firm A
reports under the full-cost method. Otherwise, if 2 is too high, A is able to preempt B simply
by choosing the full-cost method and does not have any incentive to choose the successful-eﬀorts
method. In addition, as in the main setting, we assume 1  1  .
The payoﬀ functions of firms A and B in this alternative setup are, respectively:
Π = (1−  −  + )− 1 · 0 (3)
Π = (1−  −  + )− 1 − 2 · 0 (4)
where 0 is an indicator variable that equals one if A explores one area and equals zero if A does
not not invest; 0 is an indicator variable that is one if B invests in two areas and equals to zero if
B invests in one area.
We first consider the case in which A uses the successful-eﬀorts method in this alternative
setup. We find that if A reports a success, B will imitate A’s investment. In addition, when 2 is
suﬃciently low, B will also invest in an additional area. If A reports no success, B will invest in
two diﬀerent areas. The equilibrium in this alternative setup when A uses the successful-eﬀorts is
stated in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 In the alternative setup, when A uses the successful-eﬀorts method,
(i) if firm A reports failure or does not invest at all, firm B will invest in two diﬀerent areas;
(ii) if firm A reports a success, firm B invests in the same area, and invests in one more diﬀerent
area if 2  4(1+2)9 .
We then consider the case in which A uses the full-cost method. We find that as B obtains no
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information from A’s report, B will invest in two diﬀerent areas. This result is formally stated in
Lemma 6.
Lemma 6 In the alternative setup, when A uses the full-cost method, firm B will invest in two
diﬀerent areas.
Following a similar analysis to that in the main setup, we derive the equilibrium of A and B’s
optimal investment strategy and A’s optimal reporting strategy. We formally present the results
in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 For c1   ≤ 1 or    ≤ c1 and 2  4(1+2)9 , firm A invests in one area
and chooses to report using the full-cost regime. Firm B invests in two diﬀerent areas.
For    ≤ c1 and 2  2  4(1+2)9 , firm A invests in one area and chooses to report
using the successful-eﬀort regime. Firm B invests in a same area if A reports success and invests
in two diﬀerent areas otherwise.
c1 = 2−√1+2[2+(2−)](1−)+1 .
The intuition here is similar to that in the main setting. The innovator’s and imitator’s strategies
are decided by the interaction between the information-spillover eﬀect and the preempting eﬀect.
When the information-spillover eﬀect is strong, or firm B’s investment cost is low, B has a stronger
incentive to imitate A’s successful investment. Therefore, A will choose the full-cost method to
avoid B’s imitation. When the information-spillover eﬀect becomes weaker, A may have incentive
to choose the successful-eﬀorts method to preempt B’s investment through disclosing its success.
Specifically, as B’s investment cost becomes higher, although it may still imitate A’s successful
investment, B will invest in only one area when A reports success; while if A chooses the full-cost
method, B does not have any information about A’s success and will invest in two diﬀerent areas.
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Figure 7: Firms’ investment decisions under the enforced successful-eﬀorts regime vs. under the
discretionary regime in the alternative setup.
For A, it is actually better to chooses the successful-eﬀorts since A’s report of any success secures
its preemptive advantage.
We then examine the cases of enforced accounting methods in this alternative setup. We
find that when the successful-eﬀorts method is enforced, there is a threshold 1 ( 2 ) such
that firm A will invest if 1  1 ( 2 ) and will not invest if 1  1 ( 2 ).15 The
investment decisions of firm A with the enforced successful-eﬀorts method, compared with those
in the discretionary-method regime, are illustrated in Figure 7. As depicted in Figure 7, when the
accounting-reporting method is changed from the discretionary regime to the enforced successful-
eﬀorts regime, firm A with 1 ∈ (1 ( 2 )) will stop investing. The intuition is that as
A is a small firm with very high investment costs, A cannot aﬀord an additional investment to
dilute the informative content in its accounting report under the successful-eﬀorts regime. Firm A
will stop investing because its successful investment will always be imitated by its competitor. We
conclude this finding in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 In the alternative setup, compared with the investment in the discretionary regime,
firm A invests less in innovation under the enforced successful-eﬀorts regime.
151 ( 2 )’s value is available in the Appendix.
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We also examine firm A’s innovative-investment decision in this alternative setup under the
enforced full-cost regime. We find that firm A will still invest if the full-cost method is enforced.
Therefore, the enforcement of the full-cost method does not aﬀect A’s investment decision. We
conclude this finding in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 In the alternative setup, firm A’s investment in the full-cost regime is the same as
that in the discretionary regime.
6 Empirical Implications
Our study provides empirical implications that are either consistent with the extant empirical ev-
idence, or that may be tested by future empirical research. First, our model shows that small
firms (i.e., firms with higher investment costs and smaller investments size) are concerned mainly
about the information spillover of their accounting disclosures and, as a result, tend to choose the
full-cost method. Large firms (firms with lower investment costs and larger investments), how-
ever, place more weight on the preempting eﬀect of their accounting disclosures and, consequently,
prefer the successful-eﬀorts method. These predictions are consistent with firms’ choices between
successful-eﬀorts and full-cost methods in reality. It is well documented that large oil and gas
companies usually choose successful-eﬀorts, while small oil and gas companies prefer the full-cost
method (Sunder, 1976; Deakin, 1979; Dhaliwal, 1980; Bryant, 2003). Extant empirical studies have
examined the determinants of diﬀerent accounting-disclosure choices in the oil and gas industry,
but to our knowledge there is no direct empirical test of whether market competitive forces have
implications on firms’ choices over diﬀerent disclosure methods.
Second, our model also sheds light on the consequences of enforcing uniformity in the accounting
treatment of exploratory investments. For instance, conventional wisdom may suggest that enforc-
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ing the successful-eﬀorts method might induce small firms to reduce their exploratory investments
to mitigate the subsequent earnings volatility. However, our model indicates that competitive con-
cerns may actually induce small firms to increase their investments. Indeed, if the successful-eﬀorts
method is enforced, those firms with a serious concern for a potential information spillover may
respond by undertaking larger investments to dilute the information content of their accounting
disclosures. Nevertheless, our model also predicts that those small firms that are not be able to af-
ford larger investments may instead reduce them. Indeed, facing a smaller expected return on their
investments due to a larger information spillover, they are left only with the option to reduce their
investments in exploration. The extant empirical evidence on the potential eﬀects of enforcing the
successful-eﬀorts method is very scarce. Deakin (1979) analyzes the data of oil and gas companies
around the proposal of SFAS 19, which aimed to eliminate the full-cost method, and finds that the
full-cost firms responded with more aggressive investments in exploration than the firms that used
the successful-eﬀorts method (although the diﬀerence is not significant). This very limited evidence
seems to point in the direction of our prediction that some small firms may increase their invest-
ments in exploration to dilute the information-spillover eﬀect when the successful-eﬀorts method is
enforced (Proposition 2). The lack of significance may be due to the test’s inability to distinguish
between firms that are able to aﬀord larger investments and firms that are not able to do so. More
powerful tests may actually test the predictions of our model more accurately.
Our study provides also a potential explanation for several additional puzzling empirical find-
ings. Dyckman and Smith (1978) examine the movement of successful-eﬀorts and full-cost firms’
stock returns around the FASB’s release of the Exposure Draft (ED) in 1977, which proposed the
enforcement of the successful-eﬀorts method. They find a decline in stock prices for both full-cost
firms and successful-eﬀorts firms in response to the issuance of the ED. This is contrary to the
conventional belief that successful-eﬀorts firms should not have been aﬀected by the mandated
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change in the accounting method because the new regulation implied no change in their reporting.
According to our study, small innovators who choose the full-cost method under the discretionary
regime may increase their investments when the successful-eﬀorts method is enforced. This, in
turn, may result in a more competitive product market in which all firms obtain a lower profit.
This prediction provides a potential explanation for the empirical finding that both full-cost and
successful-eﬀorts firms’ stock prices declined in response to the ED. An analogous reasoning can
potentially explain another empirical finding by Dyckman and Smith. Dyckman and Smith show
that successful-eﬀorts firms that invested more on exploration suﬀered a larger decline in their
stock price than successful-eﬀorts firms with smaller exploration investments. From our previous
argument that enforcing the successful-eﬀorts method would yield a more competitive environment,
one can infer that the return of exploration investments should decline accordingly. Therefore, the
successful-eﬀorts firms with larger exploratory investments should be more negatively aﬀected. Fi-
nally, Dyckman and Smith find that, contrary to the case of the successful-eﬀorts firms, the decline
in average returns for the full-cost firms that invest less in explorative activities is larger than those
for the full-cost firms that invest more in exploration. This finding may also be consistent with
the prediction of our study. Our model implies that firms that invest more in exploration are less
aﬀected by the information-spillover eﬀect than firms that invest less in exploration. Therefore
full-cost firms with more exploration investments will suﬀer less when the regulator enforces the
successful-eﬀorts method. In other words, firms with less exploration investments are forced to
distort more their investment decisions to avoid information spillover.
7 Conclusions
In this study, we examine firms’ investments in explorative initiatives and their choices of capital-
ization method in a product-market competition setting. Because the capitalization of exploration
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expenditures may contain information about whether a firm’s exploration investment is successful,
financial reports may reveal important information to competitors, and thus may have real conse-
quences in product-market competition. In our paper, we identify two driving forces that induce
firms to choose diﬀerent capitalization methods: an information-spillover eﬀect and a preempting
eﬀect. We also find that enforcing an accounting method that requires firms to capitalize expendi-
tures of successful explorations may increase or decrease innovation investment. Our study sheds
light on the impact that the accounting capitalization of exploratory costs has on firms’ exploration
investments.
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Appendix I
We first list firm A and B’s gross payoﬀs given diﬀerent combinations of the two firms’ explo-
ration outcomes,  and  in Table 1.  and  are useful in later proofs.
 = 0  =   = 
 = 0 19  19 (1−)
2
9  (1+2)
2
9 −
 = 1 (1+2)29  (1−)
2
9
(1+)2
9  (1+)
2
9
(1+2−)2
9  (1−+2)
2
9
 = 2 (1+4)29  (1−2)
2
9
(1+3)2
9  19 (1+4−)
2
9  (1−2+2)
2
9
Table 1: Firms A and B’s profits,  given the outcomes of explorations
For example, in the case that A and B both obtain a successful exploration in the same area,
firm A’s contribution margin per unit is increased by  and firm B’s contribution margin per
unit is increased by . Firm A then chooses its production quantity  to maximize its profit
(1−  − + ), and firm B chooses production quantity  to maximize its profit (1− −
 + ). In the equilibrium, ∗ = 1+(2−)3 and ∗ = 1+(2−1)3 . Firm A and firm B’s gross payoﬀs
without considering the exploration cost are ( ) = (1+2−)29 and ( ) = (1−+2)
2
9 
respectively.
Second, we present the close-form expressions of firm B’s expected payoﬀs based on A’s reports,
[Π|( b)], which will be used in later proofs.
When A reports under the successful-eﬀorts method, given A’s report  = ( b) and B’s
investment decision , firm B’s expected payoﬀs are:
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[Π|0(1 0)] = [Π|0(2 0)] =(0 0) = 1
9

[Π|(1 0)] = [Π|(2 0)] =(0 0)− 1 = 19 − 

1 
[Π|(1 0)] = [Π|(2 0)] = ( 0) + (1− )(0 0)− 1 = 1 + 4(1 + )9 − 

1 
[Π|0(1 1)] = (0 ) = (1− )
2
9

[Π|(1 1)] = ( )− 1 = (1− + 2)
2
9
− 1 
[Π|(1 1)] = ( ) + (1− )(0 )− 1 = (1− )
2 + 4
9
− 1 
[Π|0(2 1)] = (0 ) = (1− )
2
9

[Π|(2 1)] = 1
2
( ) + 1
2
(0 )− 1 = 1− 2(1− ) + 
2[1− 2(1− )]
9
− 1 
[Π|(2 1)] = ( ) + (1− )(0 )− 1 = (1− )
2 + 4
9
− 1 
[Π|0(2 2)] = (0 2) = (1− 2)
2
9

[Π|(2 2)] = ( 2)− 1 = (1− 2+ 2)
2
9
− 1 
[Π|(2 2)] = ( 2) + (1− )(0 2)− 1 = 1 + 4(+ − − 1)9 − 

1 
When A reports under the full-cost method, given A’s report  = ( ∅) and B’s investment
decision , firm B’s expected payoﬀs are:
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[Π|0(1 ∅)] = (0 ) + (1− )(0 0) = 1− (2− )
9

[Π|(1 ∅)] = ( ) + (1− )(0 0)− 1 = 1− − (1− + 2)
2
9
− 1 
[Π|(1 ∅)] = (1− )[Π|(1 0)] + [Π|(1 1)] = 1 + 2+ 
2(5− 4)
9
− 1 
[Π|0(2 ∅)] = 2(0 2) + (1− )2(0 0) + 2(1− )(0 ) = 1 + 2[2 + − (4− )]
9

[Π|(2 ∅)] = 2[Π|(2 2)] + (1− )2[Π|(2 0)] + 2(1− )[Π|(2 1)]
=
1 + 2[2( − 1)(1 + ) + (1 + − 2)]
9
− 1 
[Π|(2 ∅)] = 2[Π|(2 2)] + (1− )2[Π|(2 0)] + 2(1− )[Π|(2 1)]
=
1 + 62(1− )
9
− 1 
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. 1. When firm A reports full failure in its exploration, because
[Π|( 0)]−[Π|( 0)] = −4(1 + )
9
 0
and [Π|0( 0)]−[Π|( 0)] = 1 − 4(1 + )9  0 for 

1  
firm B’s optimal decision is , namely ∗() =  for  = ( 0)
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2. When firm A reports at least one successful exploration, we first compare firm B’s expected
payoﬀ with strategy  and that with strategy , and obtain the following results:
[Π|(2 1)]−[Π|(2 1)] = 2{[1− (1− )] − 2}
9

[Π|(2 2)]−[Π|(2 2)] = 4[ − (1− )− (2− )]
9

[Π|(1 1)]−[Π|(1 1)] = 4{[1− (1− )] − }
9

We can prove that
[Π|(2 1)]−[Π|(2 1)]  0 iﬀ   +
p
(− 1)2 + 8− 1
2 
[Π|(2 2)]−[Π|(2 2)]  0 iﬀ  
p
1 + 4(− 1)(1− )− 1
2 + 1
[Π|(1 1)]−[Π|(1 1)]  0 iﬀ   +
p
(− 1)2 + 4− 1
2 
We set 1 = +
√
(−1)2+8−1
2 , 2 =
√
1+4(−1)(1−)−1
2 + 1, 3 = +
√
(−1)2+4−1
2 , and we can
prove that 3  2  1
In the next step, we solve B’s optimal investment strategy based on .
(i) When 1   ≤ 1:
From the above results, we have [Π|]  [Π|] for  = (1 1) (2 1) or (2 2).
Therefore,  is a dominating strategy to  for firm B. We then compare firm B’s expected payoﬀ
by strategy  with that by strategy 0, and obtain the following results:
[Π|(2 1)]−[Π|0(2 1)] = 2[1− (1− )]
9
− 1  0 iﬀ 1  2[1− (1− )]9 
[Π|(2 2)]−[Π|0(2 2)] = 4{1− (2− )]
9
− 1  0 for any 1  
[Π|(1 1)]−[Π|0(1 1)] = 4{1− (1− )]
9
− 1  0 for any 1  
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We set 1() = 2[1−(1−)]9 . From the above results we obtain that ∗() =  for  = (1 1)
or (2 2); ∗() =  for  = (2 1) if 1  {1()} which is Region I, and ∗() = 0 for
 = (2 1) if 1()  1  , which is part of Region III.
(ii)When 2   ≤ 1 :
we can prove that
[Π|(2 1)]  [Π|(2 1)] and [Π|(2 1)]  [Π|0(2 1)] iﬀ 1  49 ;
[Π|(2 2)]  [Π|(2 2)] and [Π|(2 2)]  [Π|0(2 2)] iﬀ 1  4[1− (2− )]9 ;
[Π|(1 1)]  [Π|(1 1)], and [Π|(1 1)]  [Π|0(1 1)] iﬀ 1  4[1− (1− )]9 
We can prove that49  4[1−(2−)]9  4[1−(1−)]9 if   2+
√
1+4(+−1)−1
2 , and
4[1−(2−)]
9 
4
9  4[1−(1−)]9 if   2+
√
1+4(+−1)−1
2 
We set 2() = 4[1−(2−)]9 and  = 2+
√
1+4(+−1)−1
2 , then we can obtain the following
results:
if 1  49 which is Region II, ∗() =  for  = (1 1) or (2 2), and ∗() =  for  = (2 1);
if49  1  {2()}, which is part of Region III, ∗() =  for  = (1 1) or (2 2),
and ∗() = 0 for  = (2 1);
if 2()  1  , which is Region IV, ∗() =  for  = (1 1); ∗() = 0 for  = (2 2) or
 = (2 1).
Although we are not interested in the case that    in the paper, we still provide firm B’s
optimal strategy in this case below for completeness.
Firm B’s optimal investment strategy when    :
1. When 2    ,
if 1  2() ∗() =  for  = (1 1) or (2 2), and ∗() =  for  = (2 1);
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if 2()  1  49 , ∗() =  for  = (1 1), ∗() =  for  = (2 1), and ∗() = 0 for
 = (2 2);
if 49  1  {4[1−(1−)]9 }, ∗() =  for  = (1 1), and ∗() = 0 for  = (2 1)
or  = (2 2).
2. When 3   ≤ 2, we can prove that
[Π|(2 1)]  [Π|(2 1)] and [Π|(2 1)]  [Π|0(2 1)] iﬀ 1  49 ;
[Π|(2 2)]  [Π|(2 2)] and [Π|(2 2)]  [Π|0(2 2)] iﬀ 1  4(1− )9 ;
[Π|(1 1)]  [Π|(1 1)] and [Π|(1 1)]  [Π|0(1 1)] iﬀ 1  4[1− (1− )]9 
Therefore, we have the following results:
if 1  4(1−)9 , ∗() =  for  = (1 1); ∗() =  for  = (2 1) or  = (2 2);
if 4(1−)9  1  49 , ∗() =  for  = (1 1), ∗() =  for  = (2 1), and ∗() = 0 for
 = (2 2);
if 49  1  4[1−(1−)]9 , ∗() =  for  = (1 1), and ∗() = 0 for  = (2 1) or
 = (2 2);
if 4[1−(1−)]9  1  , ∗() = 0 for  = (1 1),  = (2 1) or  = (2 2)
3. When 0   ≤ 3, we can prove that
[Π|( 1)]  [Π|( 1)] and [Π|( 1)]  [Π|0( 1)] iﬀ 1  49 ;
[Π|(2 2)]  [Π|(2 2)] and [Π|(2 2)]  [Π|0(2 2)] iﬀ 1  4(1− )9 
Therefore, we have the following results:
if 1  4(1−)9 , ∗() =  for  = (1 1),  = (2 1) or  = (2 2);
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if 4(1−)9  1  49 , ∗() =  for  = (1 1),  = (2 1), and ∗() = 0 for  = (2 2).
if 49  1  , ∗() = 0 for  = (1 1),  = (2 1) or  = (2 2).
In the case  ≤ , from the above results we can see that when firm A invests in two areas and
reports under the successful-eﬀorts method,  is a dominated strategy for firm B. When firm A
invests in one area and reports success,  might be firm B’s optimal strategy; however firm A will
prefer the full-cost method by then to avoid firm B’s imitating as proved in Section 3.2.2. Therefore
in the equilibrium in this case, firm B will not follow firm A’s investment because  is low and the
spillover eﬀect is very weak. We do not include the detailed analysis of this case in our main text
because we focus on the imitating behavior of firm B.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. When firm A reports under the full-cost method and invests in one area, namely  = (1 ∅),
because
[Π|(1 ∅)]−[Π|(1 ∅)] = 4{1−  + [1− + (1− )]}
9
 0
and [Π|(1 ∅)]−[Π|0(1 ∅)] = 4(1 + − )
9
− 1  0 for 1  
firm B’s optimal investment decision is 
When firm A reports under the full-cost method and invests in two areas, namely  = (2 ∅),
because
[Π|(2 ∅)]−[Π|(2 ∅)] = 4{1−  + [1− (2− ) +  − 
2]}
9
 0
and [Π|(2 ∅)]−[Π|0(2 ∅)] = 4(1 + − 2)
9
− 1  0 for 1  
firm B’s optimal investment decision is .
44
Therefore, ∗() =  is Firm B’s optimal investment decision when Firm A reports under the
full-cost method.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. In section 3.2.2, we proved that when  = 1, the full-cost method is always the optimal
reporting method for firm A. Here, we then solve firm A’s optimal reporting method when  = 2.
When A reports under the full-cost method, according to Lemma 2, ∗() =  for  = ( ∅).
We have
[Π|2 ] = [Π| = 2  = ] + (1−)[Π| = 2  = 0] = 1
9
+
2
3
+ 2− 1 − 2 
When A reports under the successful-eﬀorts method, because B’s optimal strategy depends on
 and 1 , we need to consider diﬀerent regions of  and 1 
(i) In Region I, according to Lemma 1, ∗() =  for  = (2 1)or (2 2), and ∗() =  for
 = (2 0). We have
[Π|2 ] = 2(2 ) + (1− )2[(0 ) + (1− )(0 0)]
+(1− )(( ) +( 0))− 1 − 2
=
1 + {2[3 + (2− )− ] + [(3 + 2)− 4(1 + ) + 2]}
9
− 1 − 2 
It can be proved that [Π|2 ]  [Π|2 ] in Region I.
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(ii) In Region II, according to Lemma 1, ∗() =  for  = (2 2), ∗() =  for  = (2 1),
and ∗() =  for  = (2 0). We have
[Π|2 ] = 2(2 ) + (1− )2[(0 ) + (1− )(0 0)]
+2(1− )(( ) + (1− )( 0))− 1 − 2
=
1 + {2(3 + 2 − ) + [9 + 72 − (8− )]}
9
− 1 − 2 
It can be proved that [Π|2 ]  [Π|2 ] in Region II.
(iii) In Region III, according to Lemma 1, ∗() =  for  = (2 2), ∗() = 0 for  = (2 1),
and ∗() =  for  = (2 0). We have
[Π|2 ] = 2(2 ) + (1− )2[(0 ) + (1− )(0 0)] + 2(1− )( 0)− 1 − 2
=
1 + {6 + 4− 2(+ ) + [9 + (6 + − (8− ))]}
9
− 1 − 2 
It can be proved that [Π|2 ]  [Π|2 ] in Region III.
(iv) In Region IV, according to Lemma 1, ∗() = 0 for  = (2 2) or (2 1), and ∗() = 
for  = (2 0). We have
[Π|2 ] = 2(2 0) + (1− )2[(0 ) + (1− )(0 0)] + 2(1− )( 0)− 1 − 2
=
1 + [2(3− )(1 + ) + (3 + )2]
9
− 1 − 2 .
It can be proved that [Π|2 ]  [Π|2 ] in Region IV.
We define Region FC as the union of Regions I and II, and Region FC/SE as the union of
Regions III and IV.
Proof of Proposition 1
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Proof. We derive firm A’s optimal investing and reporting strategy as well as B’s optimal investing
strategy in this proof.
We first prove that A will always invest under the assumption 1   In other words, not to
invest is not A’s optimal strategy.
According to Lemma 1, if A does not invest at all ( =  = 0), ∗ = . Therefore,
[Π| = 0] = (0 ) + (1− )(0 0) = 1− (2− )
9

In Section 3.2.2, we obtain [Π|1 ] = 1−[2+(5−4)]9 −1 We can prove that [Π|0] 
[Π|1 ] when 1  Thus, for firm A, not investing is dominated by the strategy of investing
in one area and using the full-cost method.
In , according to Lemma 3, A’s optimal reporting method∗ =  and according to
Lemma 2, B’s optimal investing strategy ∗ = We then compare [Π|1 ] with [Π|2 ],
and find that ∗ = 1 if 2  4(1++)9 , and ∗ = 2 if 2  4(1++)9 .
In   ∩ , according to Lemma 3, A prefers the full-cost method if it invests
in one area, and prefers the successful-eﬀorts method if it invests in two areas. We then compare
[Π|1 ] with[Π|2 ], and find that (∗ ∗) = ( 1) if 2  {4(1+)−2(+)+[4+(10++(−8))]}9 ,
and (∗ ∗) = ( 2) if 2  {4(1+)−2(+)+[4+(10++(−8))]}9 . According to Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2, we obtain ∗() =  for  = (2 2), ∗() = 0 for  = (2 1), and ∗() =  for
 = (2 0) or (1 ∅).
In   ∩  , according to Lemma 3, A prefers the full-cost method if it invests
in one area, and prefers the successful-eﬀorts method if it invests in two areas. We then compare
[Π|1 ] with [Π|2 ], and find that (∗ ∗) = ( 1) if 2  {4+2(2−)+[4+(10+)]}9 ,
and (∗ ∗) = ( 2) if 2  {4+2(2−)+[4+(10+)]}9 . According to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2,
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we obtain ∗() = 0 for  = (2 2) or (2 1), and ∗() =  for  = (2 0) or (1 ∅).
We summarize all the thresholds for firm A’s cost in A’s investment decision by defining
( 1 ) as
( 1 ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
4(1++)
9  for  
[4(1+)−2(+)+4+(10++(−8))]
9  for   ∩ 
{4+2(2−)+[4+(10+)]}
9  for   ∩  .
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. When the successful-eﬀorts method is enforced, we compare A’s expected payoﬀs with no
investment [Π|0], one investment [Π|1 ] and two investments [Π|2 ], and then
find A’s optimal investing strategy.
As derived in the proof of Proposition 1, [Π|0] = 1−(2−)9 
As derived in Section 3.2.2,
[Π|1 ] = 1 + {2(1 + − ) + [5− − (4− )]}
9
− 1 
As derived in the proof of Lemma 3,
[Π|2 ] =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1+{2[3+(2−)−]+[(3+)2−4(1+)+2]}
9 − 1 − 2 . for  
1+{2(3+2−)+[9+72−(8−)]}
9 − 1 − 2 for  
1+{6+4−2(+)+[9+(6+−(8−))]}
9 − 1 − 2 for  
1+[2(3−)(1+)+(3+)2]
9 − 1 − 2 . for  
It can be easily proved that [Π|1 ]  [Π|0] iﬀ 1  {2(2+−)−[−(2−)
2]}
9  Setting
1 = {2(2+−)−[−(2−)
2]}
9 , we can prove that 1  .
If 1  1 , as derived above, investing in one area is a better strategy than no investment.
Then we compare [Π|2 ] with [Π|1 ], and find there is a threshold  ( 1  1 ),
that A prefers to invest in one area if 2   ( 1  1 ), and prefers to invest in two areas if
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2   ( 1  1 ).
If 1  1 , no investment is a better strategy than investing in one area. Then we compare
[Π|2 ] with [Π|0], and find there is a threshold  ( 1  1 ), that A prefers not to
invest if 2   ( 1  1 ), and prefers to invest in two areas if 2   ( 1  1 ).
The closed-form expression of  ( 1  1 ) is:
 ( 1  1 ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2(2−)(1+)+[4+(7+−4)]
9() for   and 1  ,
[4++72+(4−8)−(1−)2]+2[2+2+−(1+)]
9() for   and 1  ,
2(1−)(+)+4+[4+2+(7−)(1−)+(4−)]
9() for   and 1  ,
2(2+−2+)+[4+(7+)+(4−)]
9() for   and 1  ,
{2[4+(2−)+]+[8+6+2−4(1+)+2]}
9 − 1 for   and 1  ,
{2(2−+4)+[8+72−(8−)]}
9 − 1 for   and 1  ,
{4(2+)−2(+)+[8+(6+−(8−))]}
9 − 1 for   and 1  ,
[8+2(2−)+(2+)(4+)]
9 − 1 for   and 1  ,
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. When the successful-eﬀorts method is enforced, we have derived A’s optimal investing
strategy in Lemma 4.
For 1  1 , we can prove  ( 1  1 )  ( 1 ). Therefore, firm A’s number of
investment increases from one area to two areas if ( 1 )  2   ( 1  1 ) after the
enforcement of the successful-eﬀorts method, and does not change otherwise.
For 1  1   if , 1 are in Regions  and  (which is  ), we can prove
 ( 1  1 )  1 . Because we assume that A has a convex investment-cost function, namely
2  1 , we have 2   ( 1  1 ). Therefore, firm A doesn’t invest at all when the successful-
eﬀorts reporting method is enforced. If , 1 are in Regions  and  (which is  ),
we can prove ( 1  1 )  ( 1 ). Therefore, after the enforcement of the successful-eﬀorts
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reporting method, firm A’s number of investment increases from one to two if ( 1 )  2 
 ( 1  1 ), decreases from one to zero if 2   ( 1  1 ), and does not change otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. When the full-cost reporting method is enforced, as shown in the proof of Proposition 1,
[Π|0]  [Π|1 ], firm A will invest in at least one area.
We have already derived [Π|1 ] and [Π|2 ]’s value in the proof of Proposition 1 and
Lemma 3. Comparing [Π|1 ] with [Π|2 ], we find that [Π|1 ]  [Π|2 ] if
2  4(1++)9 , and [Π|1 ]  [Π|2 ] if 2  4(1++)9 .
Setting  = 4(1++)9 , we can prove that ( 1 ) =  in  ; ( 1 ) 
 in  .
Therefore, in  , enforcing the full-cost method does not aﬀect firm A’s investment; in
 , A’s number of investments reduces from two to one after enforcing the full-cost
method if   2  ( 1 ), and does not change otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. In the alternative setup,  ∈ {0 1}, b ∈ {0 1 ∅} and ∗() ∈ {   }, where 
means firm B invests in both A’s area and an additional area,  means firm B invests in two areas
diﬀerent from A’s investment, and  and  are the same as those in the main setup.
When A reports under the successful-eﬀorts method, we compare firm B’s expected payoﬀs of
all four possible investment strategies,  ∈ {   } based on firm A’s report ( b), and
then we solve for firm B’s optimal strategy ∗()
1. If firm A reports failure ( = (1 0)), or does not invest at all, it’s easy to prove ∗() = 
under assumption 2  2 .
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2. If firm A reports success( = (1 1)), firm B’s expected payoﬀs by diﬀerent investment
strategies are
[Π|(1 1)] = ( ) = (1− + 2)
2
9
− 1 ;
[Π|(1 1)] = ( ) + (1− )(0 ) = (1− )
2 + 4
9
− 1 ;
[Π|(1 1)] = (+  ) + (1− )( )− 1 − 2
=
1 + {−2 + 4+ 4 + [1 + 4(2+  − 1)]}
9
− 1 − 2 ;
[Π|(1 1)] = 2(2 ) + (1− )2(0 ) + 2(1− )( )− 1 − 2
=
1 + (+ 8+ 82 − 1)
9
− 1 − 2 .
As in the main setup, we only consider the case     1, and obtain that [Π|(1 1)] 
[Π|(1 1)]  0 and [Π|(1 1)]  [Π|(1 1)].
Because[Π|(1 1)]−[Π|(1 1)] = 4(1+2)9 −2 , we derive that for = (1 1) ∗() =
 if 2  {4(1+2)9 2 }, namely 2  4(1+2)9 or 1+2    1; and ∗() =  if
2  2  4(1+2)9 and     1+2 .
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. When A reports under the full-cost method, we compare firm B’s expected payoﬀs of all
four possible investment strategies,  ∈ {   }, given firm A’s report (1 ∅), in order to
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find firm B’s optimal strategy ∗() We have
[Π|(1 ∅)] = ( ) + (1− )(0 0)− 1 = 1− − (1− + 2)
2
9
− 1 ;
[Π|(1 ∅)] = 2( ) + (1− )2(0 0) + (1− )[(0 ) +( 0)]− 1 ;
=
1 + [2 + (5− 4)]
9
− 1 ;
[Π|(1 ∅)] = ((+  ) + (1− )( 0)) + (1− )[Π|(1 ∅)]− 1 − 2
=
1 + {2 + 4 + [5− 4(1− ) − (4− 8)]}
9
− 1 − 2 ;
[Π|(1 ∅)] = 2((2 ) + (1− )(2 0)) + (1− )2((0 ) + (1− )(0 0))
+2(1− )(( ) + (1− )( 0))− 1 − 2
=
1
9
+
2
3
+ 2− 1 − 2 .
We can prove that[Π|(1 ∅)]  [Π|(1 ∅)]  0 and[Π|(1 ∅)]  [Π|(1 ∅)].
Because [Π|(1 ∅)]− [Π|(1 ∅)] = 4(1++)9 − 2 , under the assumption 2 
2 , firm B’s optimal strategy when A reports under the full-cost regime is to invest in two areas
diﬀerent from A, namely ∗() =  for  = (1 ∅).
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We now derive firm A’s optimal investing and reporting strategy as well as B’s optimal
investing strategy.
Firstly we calculate firm A’s expected payoﬀs of diﬀerent investing and reporting strategies
given ∗() derived in Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
If A does not invest, we have
[Π|0] = 2(0 2) + (1− )2 (0 0) + 2(1− )(0 ) = 1 + 2(+ − 2)
9

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If A invests and reports under the full-cost regime, we have
[Π|1 ] = (2( 2) + (1− )2 ( 0) + 2(1− )( )) + (1− )[Π|0]− 1
=
1 + 62(1− )
9
− 1 
If A invests and reports under the successful-eﬀorts regime,
(i) when 2  4(1+2)9 , we have
[Π|1 ] = (( + ) + (1− )( )) + (1− )[Π|0]− 1
=
1 + {2(− ) + [6− 22 − (4− ) − (3− 2)]}
9
− 1 
(ii) when 2  4(1+2)9 , we have
[Π|1 ] = ( ) + (1− )[Π|0]− 1
=
1 + {4− 2 + [6− 22 − (4− )]}
9
− 1 
Secondly, we compare firm A’s expected payoﬀs with diﬀerent investing and reporting strategies
to derive firm A’s optimal strategy.
It can be proved that [Π|1 ]  [Π|0]. Therefore, no investment is a dominated strategy
for A.
When 2  4(1+2)9 , we can prove that [Π|1 ]  [Π|1 ]. Thus, firm A optimally
invests in one area and chooses the full-cost method, namely (∗ ∗) = ( 1).
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When 2  4(1+2)9 , we can prove that
[Π|1 ]  [Π|1 ] if   2−
p
1 + 2(2 + (2− ))(1− ) + 1
  and
[Π|1 ]  [Π|1 ] if   2−
p
1 + 2(2 + (2− ))(1− ) + 1
 
Set c1 = 2−√1+2(2+(2−))(1−)+1 , and we can conclude the above results in Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. When the successful-eﬀorts method is enforced, we have obtained the values of [Π|1 ]
and [Π|0] in the proof of Proposition 4. Comparing [Π|1 ] with [Π|0], we have
[Π|1 ]−[Π|0] =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
{2(2+−)+[(2−)2−(5−2)−22]}
9 if 2  4(1+2)9 or 1+2    1
{4+4+[(2−)2−2(1+)]−2}
9 if 2  2  4(1+2)9 and     1+2 
We can prove that {2(2+−)+[(2−)
2−(5−2)−22]}
9  ;{4+4+[(2−)
2−2(1+)]−2}
9   if
   c1, and {4+4+[(2−)2−2(1+)]−2}9   if c1    1+2 .
By defining 1 ( 2 ) as follows, we could summarize all the thresholds for firm A’s cost
in its investment decision in the alternative setup when the successful-eﬀorts reporting method is
enforced as
1 ( 2 ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{2(2+−)+[−22+(−2+)2+(−5+2)]}
9 if 2  4(1+2)9 or 1+2    1
 if 2  2  4(1+2)9 and    c1
{4+4+[−2(1+)+(−2+)2]−2}
9 if 2  2  4(1+2)9 and c1    1+2 
When the successful-eﬀorts method is enforced, firm A invests if 1  1 ( 2 ) and does
not invest if 1 ( 2 )  1  . Recall that as derived in Proposition 4, A always invests
under the discretionary-reporting regime. Therefore, enforcing the successful-eﬀorts method would
induce A to reduce its investment if 1 ( 2 )  1  .
Proof of Proposition 6
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Proof. When the full-cost method is enforced, we have obtained the values of [Π|1 ] and
[Π|0] in the proof of Proposition 4.
We have [Π|1 ]−[Π|0] = 4(1+−2)9 − 1  0 for 1  .
Therefore, firm A always invests, and the enforcement of the full-cost method does not aﬀect
A’s amount of investment.
Appendix II: Bertrand Competition model
We now study a Bertrand competition market in which the firm’s successful exploration reduces
its production cost. The payoﬀ functions of firms A and B are, respectively:
Π = [ − (− )](1−  + )− 1 − 2 
Π = [ − (− )](1−  + )− 1 
where  is firm ’s production-cost reduction obtained through successful exploration;  is firm ’s
price decision;  is the initial production cost for both firms without any successful explorations;
and 1−  +  represents firm ’s market demand for  ∈ {}.
Taking the first-order condition of Π with respect to , we can solve the Bertrand model and
obtain firm ’s optimal price ∗ =  + 1 − 23 − 3 , and gross payoﬀ with out considering the
investment/exploration cost,
( ) = [∗ − (− )](1− ∗ + ∗ ) = (3+−)
2
9 .
As in the main setting, we make some assumptions about several parameters to exclude unin-
teresting cases. We assume that A’s exploration cost cannot be extremely large, such that when the
successful-eﬀorts regime is enforced, firm A as a large firm invests in at least one area. We assume
that B’s exploration cost is not very large as well, such that when A uses the full-cost method and
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invests in two areas, B will invest. To be more specific, we assume 1  ¯ and 1  ¯.16
We also assume that  is not very small (  0), such that firm B has an incentive to follow A’s
investment in the equilibrium.17
With similar methodology as in the main setting, we can solve B ’s optimal investment decision
upon A’s report. The results are almost the same as in Lemmas 1 and 2, except for the close forms
of regions that delimit B’s strategies:
Region I is 1  {¯  01()} and 01    1;
Region II is 1  (6−)9 and 0    01;
Region III is { (6−)9   01()}  1  {¯  02()};
Region IV is  02()  1  ¯ and 0    1. 18
Firm B’s optimal strategies when firm A reports using the successful-eﬀorts method are sum-
marized in the following table:
 = (1 0) or (2 0)  = (1 1)  = (2 1)  = (2 2)
Region I ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() = 
Region II ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() = 
Region III ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() = 0 ∗() = 
Region IV ∗() =  ∗() =  ∗() = 0 ∗() = 0
Firm B optimally invests in a diﬀerent area if A reports under the full-cost method.
Given B’s optimal investment strategy upon A’s report, we could derive A’s optimal accounting-
reporting method choice and exploration investment. We obtain similar results as Proposition 1,
in the equilibrium,
16¯ = 19{[(1− )2 − ] + 6(1 + − )}, ¯ = 19(6 + − )
170 = 2− 3−
√
(3−2)2+(6−)
 
1801() = [6−(2−)]18 , 
0
1 =
−3+
√
(3−)2+2(6−)
 ; 
0
2() = [6−(4−)]9 
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(i) for Region I and Region II, firm A chooses to report under the full-cost method and firm
B always explores a diﬀerent area. Firm A explores one area if 1   0( 1 ) and explores two
areas if 1   0( 1 );
(ii) for Region III, firm A chooses to invest in one area using the full-cost method if 1 
 0( 1 ), and invests in two areas using the successful-eﬀorts method if 1   0( 1 ). B
invests in a diﬀerent area if A reports no success or chooses the full-cost method, invests in a same
area if A reports full success, and does not invest at all if A reports partial success;
(iii) for Region IV, firm A chooses to invest in one area using the full-cost method if 1 
 0( 1 ), and invests in two areas using the successful-eﬀorts method if 1   0( 1 ). B
invests in a diﬀerent area if A reports no success or chooses the full-cost method, in a same area if
A reports success in its only investment, and does not invest at all if A reports any success out of
two investments.19
Then we compare A’s optimal investment strategy when the successful-eﬀorts method is en-
forced. In this case, A invests in two areas if 1  0 ( 1 ) and invests in one area if
1  0 ( 1 ).20 We can prove that  0( 1 )  0 ( 1 ). Therefore, for firms with
 0( 1 )  1  0 ( 1 ), enforcing the successful-eﬀorts method induces them to increase
exploration investment; for firms with 1   0( 1 ) or 1  0 ( 1 ), their exploration
investment does not change after the enforcement of the successful-eﬀorts method.
When the full-cost method is enforced, firm A invests in two areas if 1  0 = (6+)9,
and in one area otherwise. We can prove that  0( 1 ) > 0 . Therefore, for firms with
0  1   0( 1 ), enforcing the full-cost method induces them to decrease exploration
190( 1 ) =



(6 + )9   
{6 + 12− 6(+ ) + [1 + (2 + − (4− ))]}9  
[6 + 6(2− ) + (1 + )2]9  
200 ( 1 ) =



[6 + 6(1− ) + (1 + + 2 − 2)]9  
{6[1 +  + 2 − (1 + )] + [1 + 32 + (2− )− (1 + (4− ))]}  
{6[1 + (1− )(+ )] + [1 + + 2 + (2− 4)− 2(1− )]}9  
{6(1 + +  − 2) + [1 + + 2 + (2− )]}9  
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investment; for firms with 1   0( 1 ) or 1  0 , their exploration investment does not
change after the enforcement of the full-cost method.
In summary, in the Bertrand competition model, the result is the same as that in the Cournot
market.
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